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ABSTRACT

British Home Stores collapsed led 11,000 employees to lose their jobs and faced
substantial cuts to their pension with a £571 million pension deﬁcit. In light of the
BHS scandal, the UK Government has proposed a set of corporate governance
reforms to strengthen the employee voice. Although the government’s approach
towards strengthening the employees’ protection is well intentioned, we argue
that without providing a derivative claim right for employees, these measures will
likely have little impact in practice. Hence we suggest that to safeguard the
employees’ interest in the company and to enhance the overall protection of the
company, in addition to the current proposed reforms, the standing for bringing
derivative claims should be broadened to the employee’s representative.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 15 August 2017; Accepted 29 June 2018
KEYWORDS British home stores; abuse of power; employee’s vulnerability; corporate governance
reforms; employees derivative claim right

1. Introduction
British Home Stores, one of the iconic high street chains, collapsed in 2016,
which led to the loss of 11,000 employees’ jobs and 20,000 current and
future pensioners facing substantial cuts to their entitlements with a £571
million pension deﬁcit. The store collapse resulted in an awkward parliamentary inquiry and a potential criminal investigation for its owners and the House
of Commons report has described the owners’ misconducts as ‘an insult to the
company’s employees and pensioners’.1
However, the most important fact that the BHS collapse unwrapped was
the weakness of UK corporate law in terms of supporting corporate employees’ interests in the company. Now, in light of the BHS scandal, the UK Government has set out some reforms to strengthen the employee voice.
CONTACT Neshat Safari
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The Government’s speciﬁc plans for improving the protection of employees have been set in form of (1) Introducing secondary legislation to
require all companies of signiﬁcant size to explain how their directors
comply with the requirements of section 172 to have regard to employee
and other stakeholders’ interests; (2) inviting the FRC to consult on a
speciﬁc Code provision requiring premium-listed companies to adopt, on a
‘comply or explain’ basis, one of three employee engagement mechanisms:
a designated non-executive director; a formal employee advisory council; or
a director from the workforce; and (3) encouraging the GC 100 group of the
largest listed companies to prepare guidance on the practical interpretation
of the directors’ duty under section 172 of Companies Act 2006.2 In addition
to the mentioned plans, the Government has unveiled some other corporate
governance reforms such as standardizing executive pay and establishing a
voluntary corporate governance code for large private companies. Although
the government’s approach towards strengthening the employees’ protection
is well intentioned, we argue that these measures will likely have little impact
in practice. In fact, the proposed reforms merely oﬀer tokenism rather than a
much-needed call to action.
Employees are important stakeholders in a company who play a vital role in
its long-term success and sustainability. Hence, they need a tougher mandatory enforcement mechanism enabling them to protect the company and
consequently their interests against wrongdoer directors and controlling
shareholders who abuse their positions and put their well-being in danger.
Therefore, we propose that in order to safeguard the employees’ interest in
the company and to enhance the overall protection of the company, in
addition to the proposed reforms, the standing for bringing derivative
claims should be broadened to the employee’s representative.
Our argument is that tragedies like BHS might have been prevented if the
company employees had had the right to bring a derivative claim. While there
were no other mechanisms from outside to stop the harms to the company,
the derivative claim’s deterrent function could have enabled the employees to
sue the BHS wrongdoers on behalf of the company for their negligence and
mismanagement and might have prevented them from further misappropriation of the company’s assets. Our proposal would be a threat to potential
wrongdoers like Mr Green, who in turn might be more cautious about the consequences of their misconduct, and it would prevent them from easily enriching themselves on the back of the company with no concern for anyone else.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the reasons for giving
separate consideration to employee interests in the company. Section 3
reviews employees’ interest consideration in the UK, the background that
2

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance Reform, The Government
response to the Green Paper consultation, p 3.
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formed the enlightened shareholder value principle and the current shortcomings of section 172 CA 2006. Section 4 reviews the proposed corporate
governance reforms intended to strengthen the employees’ voice and
discuss why these actions will be insuﬃcient in practice. Section 5 explains
how employees’ derivative claims could prevent tragedies like BHS and discusses the implementation of an employees’ derivative claim in the UK.

2. Why corporate law should consider employee interests
Since the rise of the law and economics movement in the 1970s, corporate
law and corporate governance theory has been mainly focused on agency
problems arising from conﬂicts of interest between shareholders and managers as well as among shareholders.3 Normatively, the primacy of shareholders and the limitation residual governance rights and the ability to sue
derivatively to this group has usually been justiﬁed with their position as
residual risk-bearers in the ﬁrm. While other groups, including employees,
have often been thought as having contractually speciﬁed obligations and
rights,4 shareholders simply get what is left in the form of dividends or an
increased share value after everyone else’s demands have been satisﬁed.5
Consequently, to achieve the best possible outcome for everyone, it suﬃces
to maximize shareholder wealth.
This ‘shareholder primacy view’ provides a powerful framework for the
analysis for most core aspect of corporate law. It is unable to account fully
for the eﬀects of corporate law on employees, who are usually seen as a distraction and a potential coalition partner for managers in opportunism vis-àvis shareholders. However, there are at least two reasons to consider
employee interests separately, namely human capital and pension obligations
that create a ﬁnancial interest for workers.

2.1. Human capital
Depending on how easily transferable an employee’s education, training and
abilities are, that individual’s human capital can be classiﬁed as general, industry-speciﬁc or ﬁrm-speciﬁc.6 The most problematic type is ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
See the classical exposition of the agency problem by Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305; also Lyman Johnson, ‘Corporate Law Professors as Gatekeepers’ (2009) 6 University of
St. Thomas Law Journal 447 (identifying shareholder wealth maximization as the goal of corporate law
according to the majority of scholars); Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law (Harvard University Press 1991).
4
ibid 11.
5
ibid.
6
Gary Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education (University of Chicago Press 1964) 11; See also Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Harvard University Press 1996); James Malcomson, ‘Individual Employment Contracts’ in Orley Aschenfelter and
3
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capital, which employees cannot take to another employer.7 Assuming that
the acquisition of this type of capital is costly for the employee, investment
in this type of skill will be discouraged if this investment is not protected. In
principle, the solution to this problem would be a long-term contract.
However, in reality, contractual protection often reaches similar limits as
legal protection, simply because real-life contracts do not correspond to the
‘complete contingent’ model of the economic theory. Contract theory
suggests that contracts are incomplete because payoﬀ and the distribution
of rents among parties cannot be stipulated for each possible future state
of the world, however unlikely.8 The reason may be of cognitive limitations
or high transaction cost.
Employers might still want employees to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills if it
enables them to do their job more eﬀectively, thus enhancing the ﬁrm’s
overall competitiveness.9 Speciﬁc human capital may include skills to
perform a particular job, but also idiosyncratic combinations of skills.10 In
some cases, speciﬁc human capital may be organizational knowledge and
the ability to work in a particular group or organizational hierarchy or to
work within a particular corporate culture.11 As a popular corporate ﬁnance
textbook notes, ‘managers and employees of a ﬁrm are investors, too. … If
you give ﬁnancial capital too much power, the human capital doesn’t show
up – or if it does show up, it won’t be properly motivated’.12 If employers
can easily engage in opportunistic conduct harming employees (e.g. in
wage renegotiations),13 shareholders might beneﬁt ex post, but employees
may be discouraged from human capital investment.

David Card (eds), 3 Handbook of Labor Economics (Science Direct 1991); David Neumark, ‘Productivity,
Compensation, and Retirement’ in Gordon Clark, Alicia Munnell and J. Michael Orszag (eds), Oxford Handbook of Pensions and Retirement Income (Oxford University Press 2006); Larry Fauver and Michael Fuerst,
‘Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate
Boards’ (2006) 82 Journal of Financial Economics 673.
7
Hansmann (n 6); also Malcomson (n 6); Gavin Kelly and John Parkinson, ‘The Conceptual Foundations of
the Company: A Pluralist Approach’ in John Parkinson, Andrew Gamble and Gavin Kelly (eds), The Political
Economy of the Company (Hart Publishing 2000); David Kershaw, ‘No End in Sight for the History of Corporate Law: The Case of Employee Participation in Corporate Governance’ (2002) 2 Journal of Corporate
Law Studies 34; John Armour and Simon Deakin, ‘Insolvency and Employment Protection: The Mixed
Eﬀects of the Acquired Rights Directive’ (2003) 22 The International Review of Law and Economics
443; Fauver and Fuerst (n 6); Neumark (n 6) 721–22.
8
Alan Schwartz, ‘Incomplete Contracts’ in Peter Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
and the Law (Palgrave Macmillan 1999) 277.
9
E.g. Luca Enriques and others, ‘The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies’, in Reinier Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law (Oxford University
Press, 3rd edn, 2017), 79, 89 (noting that proﬁts will be harmed if employees undertake less ﬁrm-speciﬁc
investments in human capital).
10
Edward Lazear, Inside the Firm (Oxford University Press 2011) 342.
11
E.g. Egon Franck, Stephan Nüesch and Jan Pieper, ‘Speciﬁc Human Capital as a Source of Superior Team
Performance’ (2011) 63 Schmalenbach Business Review 376; John Coﬀee, ‘Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web’ (1986) 85 Michigan Law Review 1.
12
Richard Brealey, Stewart Myers and Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance (8th edn, S&P Global
2006) 949.
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One might argue that these beneﬁts are hardly tangible and diﬃcult to
measure, and thus default to the shareholder primacy perspective in corporate law. After all, speciﬁc human capital of this type be present only in a few
ﬁrms or certain industries. However, arguably employees are in a far more precarious position than shareholders. At least in publicly traded, widely held
ﬁrms shareholders typically can sell their shares and thus cut their losses in
the case at a relatively limited cost. A troubling situation in any particular
ﬁrm should thus not inﬂict an existential crisis on a properly diversiﬁed investor. This is typically not true for larger blockholders such as controlling families
that have much of their capital tied up in the ﬁrm. However, these shareholders are in a good position to look after their own interest by inﬂuencing
corporate management and consequently should enjoy relatively strong
control over the risk to which they are exposed. By contrast, employees typically have only one job, meaning that the risk of corporate collapse is very signiﬁcant for their continued ability to earn a livelihood.14 Even if they do not
have ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital that exposes them to a particular risk, transitioning to a new job typically entails a signiﬁcant cost, including relocation.

2.2. Pension wealth
Most employees expect to retire at some point in their life, and the standard of
living they will have in retirement is of great importance for individual wellbeing once individuals are no longer able to support themselves. As a part
of pension wealth, occupational pension plans are often a signiﬁcant component of the funds at the disposal of an employee for her sustenance in
retirement.
Diﬀerent types of plan expose employees to varying types of risk. In an
unfunded DB (deﬁned beneﬁt) plan, the employer is on the hook for paying
employees when pensions are due. Employees are essentially creditors of
the employer hoping that the latter is capable of fulﬁlling the progress after
their retirement. In a funded DB plan, the employer bears the investment
risk, but is still on responsible for a potential shortfall. Again, the employees
are creditors, but at least they are secured to the extent as the set aside
funds cannot be used by the employer for other purposes or are insured.15
They are exposed to the risk of the employer’s insolvency only to the
Thomas Eger, ‘Opportunistic Termination of Employment Contracts and Legal Protection Against Dismissal in Germany and the USA’ (2004) 23 International Review of Law & Economics 381.
Kent Greenﬁeld, ‘The Place of Workers in Corporate Law’ (1998) 39 Boston College Law Review 283.
15
Barry Friedman, ‘Individual Accounts and the Continuing Debate over Social Security Reform in the
United States’ in Martin Rein and Winfried Schmähl (eds), Rethinking the Welfare State (Edward Elgar
2004) (noting the risk of employer bankruptcy in a DB plan); see also Steven Sass, ‘The Development
of Employer Retirement Income Plans: From the Nineteenth Century to 1980’ in Gordon Clark and
Alicia Munnell (eds), Oxford Handbook on Pensions and Retirement Income (Oxford University Press
2007) (“If the employer went bust, so would the beneﬁts of current and future pensioners”); Sandy Mackenzie, The Decline of the Traditional Pension (Cambridge University Press 2010) 53.
13
14
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extent of a funding gap, which could open because of a decline in the stock
market.16 By contrast, in a deﬁned contribution (DC) plan, employees bear the
investment risk. Employees are in the position of equity investors17 exposed
to movements in the stock market.18
Pension wealth may tie employees’ well-being to their employer’s fate,
depending on the structure of the pension plan. While a properly diversiﬁed
DC plan does not create any additional dependence, workers are among the
ﬁrm’s shareholders in an ESOP (Employee Stock Option Plans), whose terms
may even prohibit them from diversifying. This exposes employees to the
risk of the employer’s default, which turned out to be a signiﬁcant issue for
employees of Enron after its collapse in 2001.19 In a DB plan, as the one formerly
provided by BHS, employees are creditors, but they are still in the unfortunate
position of having both their human and ﬁnancial capital tied to the fortunes of
one particular ﬁrm. In BHS, According to the House of Commons report, the
pension schemes had a combined surplus of £43 million when Sir Philip
Green bought the company in 2000. Nonetheless, the surplus gradually diminished during the years of his ownership and ﬁnally, by the time of the company
sale to RAL in 2015, the value of the schemes’ assets fell short of the liabilities by
almost £350 million.20 BHS had declined to make the employer contributions
necessary to preserve the sustainability of the pension schemes.21
Although some argue that the pension deﬁcits mainly emerged because of
the interest rate reduction by the Bank of England following the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis,22 however, Sir Philip Green could have protected the scheme by investing in it and he did not. The House of Common report states that BHS had
declined to make the employer contributions necessary to preserve the sustainability of the pension schemes.23
In 2015, the pension fund’s position became so bad that Project Thor was
proposed internally to Sir Philip Green. The project included several features
16

Friedman (n 15) 220.
Alicia Munnell and Annika Sundén, Coming Up Short; The Challenge of 401(k) Plans (Brookings Institution
Press 2004) 68.
18
Andrew Samwick and Jonathan Skinner, ‘How Will 401(k) Pension Plans Aﬀect Retirement Income?’
(2004) 94 American Economic Review 329. Regarding the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial crisis, see Edward
Whitehouse, Anna D’Addio and Andrew Reilly, ‘Investment Risk and Pensions: Impact on Individual
Retirement Incomes and Government Budgets’ [2009] OECD Social, Employment and Migration
Working Papers No. 87, 47.
19
David Millon, ‘Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership’ (2002) 1 Seattle Journal of Social Justice
113; Munnell and Sundén (n 17); Jeﬀrey Gordon, ‘What Enron Means for the Management and Control of
the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reﬂections’ (2002) 69 University of Chicago Law Review
1233.
20
The House of Commons inquiry to BHS report, para 19.
21
ibid; also BHS pension trustee minutes, 11 June 2002, 24 November 2006, 13 February 2007, 8 May 2009,
26 August 2009.
22
Matt Hitchens, IF researcher on behalf of the intergenerational foundation, 2016, DB Pensions: Choking
Hazard, How Deﬁned beneﬁt schemes are throttling the UK economy <http://www.if.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Pensions-Throttling_Final.compressed.pdf> accessed 20 May 2017
23
The House of Commons inquiry to BHS report, para 19; see also BHS pension trustee minutes, 11 June
2002, 24 November 2006, 13 February 2007, 8 May 2009, 26 August 2009.
17
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including restructuring the pension schemes. Nevertheless, Sir Philip Green
found Project Thor to be too expensive and decided to sell BHS instead.
The BHS buyer was Retail Acquisitions Limited (RAL) owned by Dominic Chappell, a three-times-bankrupt ex-racing driver with little experience of retail.
The House of Commons report found that the BHS sale at that time was ‘substantially detrimental’ to the pension schemes.24
The new owners were aware that the pension schemes were in heavy
deﬁcit when they bought BHS. In fact, in addition to Sir Philip and the BHS
managers during his ownership, the House of Commons report considers
Dominic Chappell and RAL’s directors responsible for the BHS pension
scheme deﬁciency. They accepted responsibility for the company with a ‘negligent’ and ‘careless attitude’ towards the risks and potential consequences.
This negligence was paired with incompetence and a self-serving attitude
throughout their tenure. The new owner failed to recruit a retail expert
despite his own lack of experience. He failed to secure funding on commercial
terms, failed to address BHS’s property leases in a timely way, and made many
other mistakes in managing the company.
The company collapsed and went into administration in 2016. The collapse
of BHS resulted in the redundancy of 11,000 employees, who were left with no
retirement plan. Sir Philip has already managed to escape legal action by the
Pension Protection Fund though the £363 million settlement with the Pension
regulator. However, the settlement did not erase the bitter fact that he
himself, and his family, beneﬁted signiﬁcantly from excessive dividends at
the expense of the BHS employees, as did Dominic Chappell and all of their
respective directors and advisers.25

3. Background to the consideration of employee interests in the
UK
As we have seen in the previous part, employee are often strongly exposed to
decisions made by the board of directors; as illustrated by BHS, unlike shareholders they are typically in a bad position to protect their interests in the
company and diversify their risk. It is therefore not surprising that, even prior
to the UK Government’s proposed reforms for strengthening the employees’
voice, company law often played an important role for employee interests. In
this part, we survey the historical background. Before the recent proposal,
there were two formative periods that shaped the present law, namely (1)
the debate following the Bullock report in 1977 and subsequent changes to
the Companies Act, and (2) the discussion about ‘enlightened shareholder
value’ that led to section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006.
24

The House of Commons inquiry to BHS report, para 44.
ibid paragraphs 9, 11, 44, 54 and 171.

25

50

N. SAFARI AND M. GELTER

3.1. From the Bullock Report to section 309 of the Companies Act 1985
The debate about employees in UK company law ﬁrst ﬂared up in the 1970s. In
light of case law binding directors closely towards following shareholder interests,26 the Conservative Government’s Companies Bill of 1973 ﬁrst proposed
to widen the discretion of directors by entitling them ‘to have regard in exercising their powers include the interests of the company’s employees as well
as the interests of its members’.27 After coming to power in 1974, the Labour
Government pursued an even more radical project and commissioned the
1977 Report on Industrial Democracy developed by a commission chaired
by Lord Alan Bullock.28 This report recommended a form of codetermination
comparable to the one in the largest German ﬁrms, with union representatives
having equal representation.29
‘Industrial democracy’ failed in Britain not primarily because of opposition
from business circles, but because labour itself did not fully support it. Unions
feared being drawn into management responsibilities and losing their independence from capital.30 Moreover, the Labour Party depended on the
Liberal Party and the support of the City of London for its economic
policy.31 The unions did not want to jeopardize legislative projects they considered a higher priority, such as employment protection statutes.32 Following
the more moderate White Paper of 1978, Labour did not pass a law33 until the
Conservatives came back into power in 1979.
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government introduced section 46 of
Companies Act 1982 in 1979. The section stated that ‘the matters to which
the directors of a company are to have regard in the performance of their
functions shall include the interests of the company’s employees in general
as well as the interests of its members’.34 Even if the proposal of the
Bullock report was not enacted, one might have expected it to improve the
position of employees in corporate law to some extent, but in practice the
provision proved to be of little consequence, not least due to the absence
26

Parke v. Daily News [1962] Ch. 927 (ﬁnding that directors could not make voluntary redundancy payments to employees without a related beneﬁt to the company).
27
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, ‘Employees, Partnership and Company Law’ (2002) 31 Industrial law
Journal 99.
28
Alan Bullock Baron, ‘Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy’ (1977) 6706 HM
Stationery Oﬃce.
29
However, the report advised against the introduction of a two-tier board. See Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Industrial Democracy’ (1977) 6 I ndustrial Law Journal 65.
30
David Marsh and Gareth Locksley, ‘Capital in Britain: Its Structural Power and Inﬂuence Over Policy’
(1983) 6 West European Politics 36, 49–50; Herman Knudsen, Employee Participation in Europe (Sage Publications 2015) 54. There were a number of issues of dispute, such as the appointment process which
would have been channelled through the unions in the absence of mandatory works councils in the
UK. See Kahn-Freund (n 29) 67–68.
31
Marsh and Locksley (n 30) 50.
32
Lord Wedderburn of Charleton, The Worker and the Law (3rd edn, Penguin Books Ltd 1986).
33
Marsh and Locksley (n 30).
34
Companies Act 1980, s 46.
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of an enforcement mechanism.35 Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985, the
immediate successor of section 46 of the Companies Act 1980, inherited
exactly the same features.36
Without either a ‘codetermined’ board or an enforcement power for
employees, s. 309 remained a toothless tiger.37 Shareholders could hardly
be expected to pursue an action in a case of shareholder-employee conﬂict
of interests.38 Commentators continued to assert that the guiding principle
of UK Company Law remained shareholder primacy.39

3.2. Employees and the Companies Act 2006
The issue of employees and corporate governance came on the table again
when the Labour government initiated the Company Law Review Steering
Group (CLRSG) in 1998 to reform the company object.40 Although the Steering
Group considered both ‘pluralism’ as well as what came to be known as
‘Enlightened Shareholder Value’, they ultimately selected the second
option.41 The CLRSG raised a number of issues with regard to the application
of the stakeholder principle in the UK corporate law.42 In particular, it argued
that stakeholder protection should generally be pursued outside of company
law, given that a reform of company law itself would require an essential
change to the current framework with unpredictable and potentially damaging eﬀects.43 Most of all, the CLRSG feared that giving directors discretion
to consider the interests of stakeholders’ other than shareholders’ would
dangerously distract directors, thus reducing British ﬁrms’ competitiveness.44
D.D. Prentice, ‘A Company and Its Employees: The Companies Act 1980’ (1981) 10 Industrial Law Journal
1; Simon Deakin and Giles Slinger, ‘Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm’ (1997)
24 Journal of Law and Society 124; Christopher Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World:
The Political Foundations of Shareholder Power (Cambridge University Press 2013) 164.
36
Neither of the provisions empowered employees with an enforcement mechanism, nor were they understood, for example, to allow board to consider the eﬀect of a takeover on employees in their obligations
under the Takeover Code. John Armour, Simon Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann, ‘Shareholder Primacy
and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance’ (2003) 41 British Journal of Industrial Relations 537.
37
Simon Deakin and Giles Slinger, ‘Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm’ (1977) 24
Journal of Law and Society 135.
38
Prentice (n 35) 4–5; see also Len Sealy and Sarah Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law
(10th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 177; J.E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues
in the Theory of Company Law (Clarendon Press 1995).
39
Wedderburn of Charlton, ‘Companies and Employees: Common Law or Social Dimension?’ (1993) 109
Law Quarterly Review 220; Paul Davies, ‘Shareholder Value, Company Law, and Securities Markets
Law: A British View’ in Klaus Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets And Company Law
(Oxford University Press 2003) 261; Jonathan Rickford, ’Fundamentals, Developments and Trends in
British Company Law – Some Wider Reﬂections’ (2004) 1 European Company and Financial Law
Review 391 (arguing for a shareholder primacy interpretation).
40
Department of Trade and Industry, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy 1.1 (1998), at
<http://www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle23283.pdf> accessed 7 May 2017.
41
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic
Framework 40 (February 1999), at <http://www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle23279.pdf> accessed 7 May 2017.
42
ibid paras 5.1.25–5.1.33.
43
ibid para 5.1.27.
44
ibid para 5.1.28.
35
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The UK enlightened shareholder value is now encapsulated in section 172
of the Companies Act 2006 as a ‘duty to promote the success of the company’.
One of the matters that directors should have regard to, according to section
172(1), is the interests of employees. The only other group’s interest section
172 refers to it explicitly is creditors.45
Consequently, ultimately more in line with the traditional understanding of
company law than the prior s 309, the new ‘enlightened shareholder value’
approach of s 172 sees stakeholder interests only as instrumental to long-term
shareholder wealth maximization.46 Commentators seem to agree that the
requirement remains largely subjective, given that it must read in combination
with the statutory requirement of ‘good faith’.47 Authors of an early handbook
on the Companies Act, therefore, speculated that the enlightened shareholder
value approach might well turn out not entail an actual obligation for practical
purposes, but – as did its predecessor – a defence for directors against reproach.48
Andrew Keay goes even further, arguing that ‘the provision … grants unfettered
discretion to the directors to act in a way that they consider would most likely
promote the success of the company for the beneﬁt of the members’.49
The CLRSG rejected a separate consideration of the interests of stakeholders, including employees, based on the argument that it would give directors broad discretion that would be diﬃcult to police.50 However, the current
enlightened shareholder value principle’s approach has brought the CLRSG’s
assertion in rejecting the pluralism into question. It has inherited exactly the
same problem by giving the same wide discretion to directors without a clear
wording in the Act or providing a guideline for directors regarding how and
when they should consider the interests of employees. Despite recent
attempts to clarify the ambiguities of section 172 as part of the ongoing corporate governance reform, the Government still has no plans to change the
wording of section 172. However, it has declared that the GC 100 group of
the largest listed companies will be required to prepare guidance on the
practical interpretation of the directors’ duty under section 172 of Companies
45

Section 172(1)(b) of the Companies Act 2006 clearly requires directors to in promoting the success of the
company have regard to the interests of the company’s employees. Also section (172)(3) gives a separate
emphasis on the interest of creditors in certain circumstances.
46
For a detailed account of the arguments put forward in the debate, see Sarah Kiarie, ‘Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the United
Kingdom Take?’ (2006) 17 International Company and Commercial Law Review 329; Brenda Hannigan
and others, The Companies Act 2006 – A Commentary (LexisNexis UK 2007).
47
Andrew Keay, ‘Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s
“Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach”’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 108; Charles Wynn-Evans,
‘The Companies Act 2006 and the Interests of Employees’ (2007) 36 Industrial Law Journal 188, 191; Hannigan et al. (n 46) 31.
48
Geoﬀrey Morse and others, Palmer’s Company Law: Annotated Guide to the Companies Act 2006, 168
(Sweet & Maxwell 2007); Keay (n 47).
49
Keay (n 47) 107; see also Daniel Attenborough, ‘The Company Law Reform Bill: An Analysis of Directors’
Duties and the Objective of the Company’ (2006) 27 Company Lawyer 162.
50
Company Law Review, ‘Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Strategic Framework’
(London, 1999), para 5.1.30.
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Act 2006.51 As we discuss below, the practical eﬀect of the proposed guidance
is dubious.
Still, one important criticism to the Companies Act 2006 is the lack of an enforcement mechanism for employees to enable them to protect their interests in
situations of director misconduct. The only group with actual enforcement possibilities remain shareholders under the statutory derivative claim and apart from
situations in which employees double as shareholders, they have not been
empowered by the Companies Act 2006 to enforce the compliance of their interests embodied in section 172(1). As the law ultimately only serves shareholders’
interests, only shareholders are even in the position to safeguard the interests of
employees against management. In practice, however, shareholders are unlikely
to bring a time-consuming and an expensive derivative claim to protect the
employees’ interests. While the debate about short-termism in corporate governance is far from settled, shareholders may sometimes prioritize short-term proﬁt
maximisation goals and thus care mainly about investment returns in the near
future. Hence, they may be reluctant to be involved in corporate governance
matters and costly monitoring of their investee companies or they may not
care if their companies earn proﬁts by breaking the law or hurting employees.52
The deﬁciencies of section 172 and the employees need for a stronger protection under the company law have become evident to the UK government,
which has responded with a proposed package of reforms with the aim of
strengthening the employees’ voice. In the next section, we discuss that
why the proposed reforms are not suﬃcient and why employees need a
derivative claim right as a complementary mechanism.

4. The Government’s new package of reforms: Would it prevent
tragedies like BHS?
The House of Commons report named the BHS scandal as ‘the unacceptable
face of capitalism’,53 and the UK Prime Minister Theresa May has promised to
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stamp out irresponsible corporate behaviour through the new corporate governance framework.
In light of tragedies like BHS, the UK Government has proposed reforms in
three main aspects of corporate governance. The proposed plans have three
key components: Fixing executive pay; strengthening the employee, customer and supplier voice; and extending the corporate governance code to
large privately held businesses.
For strengthening the employees’ voice, the Government’s intention is to:
introduce secondary legislation and require all companies of signiﬁcant size
(private as well as public) to explain how their directors comply with the requirements of section 172 to have regard to employee and other interests. Also on a
‘comply or explain’ basis, FRC requires premium-listed companies to adopt one
of three employee engagement mechanisms: a designated non-executive director; a formal employee advisory council; or a director from the workforce. Furthermore, the government intends to invite the GC100 group of the largest
listed companies to complete and publish new guidance on the practical
interpretation of directors’ duties in section 172 of the Companies Act.
The Government’s assumption is that these proposals will drive change in
how big companies engage with their key stakeholders by putting higher
expectations on companies especially on leading, premium-listed companies.
Before discussing our proposal, this section analyses the Government’s proposed reforms in order to determine if they are likely to be eﬀective in practice. We argue that more far-reaching reforms than the ones envisioned by the
government are needed, such as the derivative claim for employees that we
are proposing.

4.1. ‘Comply or explain’ models of employee engagement
4.1.1. Designation of existing non-executive directors
Under the proposed reforms, assigning an existing non-executive director to
represent the interest of employees is one of the options which premiumlisted companies can adopt on the basis of the ‘comply or explain’ principle.54
However, it is neither clear at this stage that how the designated non-executive director is supposed to increase the voice of employees at the board level,
nor whether the designated non-executive director will act for diﬀerent stakeholder groups or only for the employees in the company.
Some respondents to the Government Green Paper have suggested that
there should be more than one non-executive director acting as a point of
liaison for diﬀerent stakeholder.55 Other respondents have suggested that
54
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non-executive director(s) should be able to meet management, the workforce
and unions to discuss matters of concern; should have access to employee
engagement survey results and other statistics; should be able to consult
with key suppliers; and should be able to review customer feedback, including
complaints. Regardless of the extent to which the Government would apply
the proposed recommendations in deﬁning the role of the non-executive
directors for employees, it is unlikely that this option would be eﬀective.

4.1.2. Problems with the role of the non-executive director
It is diﬃcult to analyse the possible impacts of designating a non-executive
director to increase the voice of stakeholders without knowing how the mechanism will be implemented. Respondents to the Green Paper have raised the
concern that, if the non-executive director is expected to promote rather than
channel the interests of particular groups, the role could potentially conﬂict
with the joint duties of directors and compromise their independence.
There are also concerns that designated non-executive directors could ﬁnd
themselves isolated on the board, unable to provide an eﬀective challenge.56
Another concern is the diﬃculty of reconciling diverging stakeholder interests.
We can add some general concerns about the role of non-executive directors and its eﬃcacy, in spite of the fact that non-executive directors have long
been considered a key part of the corporate governance. Although nonexecutive directors have broad duties to monitor the executive directors’
conduct, there is a lack of clarity on how they should perform their duties
and what ﬁduciary duties they have towards the company.57 In addition,
they may not always completely understand the complexities of the
businesses they direct.58 Moreover, they may lack incentives to eﬀectively
perform the tasks that have been assigned to them,59 unless they are provided with strong ﬁnancial incentives that likely align their interests with
those of shareholders only. Further, they may be under the inﬂuence of the
executive directors who have proposed them.60
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4.1.3. Formal employee advisory council
The second option under the government plan is a formal employees’ advisory council. As for the previous option, it is not clear how this body is
expected to strengthen the employees’ voice. Also, it is not clear that how
the council members would be chosen and what kind of task they would
have. If works council in Germany and other Continental European jurisdictions serve as the model, would employees elect the council members themselves, or would the task be given to the directors or shareholders?
What impact would the council have on the board decisions? Would the
panel have enough power to challenge the board? Would they participate
in decisions about company strategy and its execution? Would they similar
to the work councils in Germany have an impressive set of information, consultation and co-decision rights? 61
Respondents to the Green Paper have suggested, among other things that:
the panel should be able to issue an annual public statement (potentially as
part of the annual report) and commission independent investigations, in
order to maintain its independent voice. The panel should ensure that
board and management are clear about key risks and amplify perspectives
that may be absent or weak at board level. Moreover, the panel could have
a formal consultative role with the remuneration committee in reviewing
executive pay policies and performance. While it is unclear whether the Government will implement any of these suggestions, it is evident that the
employee advisory council as the sole mechanism would not have suﬃcient
mandatory nature to oblige directors to consider the employees’ interests
in their decision-making, nor it would have strong power to prevent the directors’ opportunistic behaviour.
4.1.4. Appointment of an employees’ representative to boards
The third proposed employee’s engagement mechanism is appointing a
director from the workforce, which was actually one of the UK Prime Minister’s
campaign pledges. However, she eventually stepped back from her initial
promise by substituting mandatory employees’ representative with optional,
but strongly encouraged workforce representation for public listed
companies.
As a general concept, providing employees with the right to have a representative on board could provide some advantages both to the company and
to the employees themselves. The economic rationale for employee representation is that employees may be more motivated to invest in the company
speciﬁc skills if they are less exposed to threats of opportunistic wage negotiations or termination of pension plans.62 Also, employees’ representative
Paul Davies, ‘Eﬃciency Arguments for the Collective Representation of Workers: A Sketch’ in C. Costello,
Bogg, Paul Davies and J. Prassl (eds), The Autonomy of Labour Law (Hart Publishing 2014).
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could introduce diﬀerent perspectives on the operation of the company.
Some argue that employee participation may reduce information asymmetries between executives and others employees and thus decrease the costs
of collective bargaining and the incidence of strikes,63 given that employees’
representative could have hands-on knowledge of the daily operations of the
company.64 Better-informed employees may be less likely to object to necessary restructuring.65
Naturally, there are some potential problems. The ﬁrst important point
is that the employees‘ representative in the UK as a voluntary option
based on comply and explain principle might not be eﬀective in practice.
Listed companies might not see this as an opportunity to engage with
employees. Even if companies choose this option, some factors might
undercut its potential beneﬁts. It is not clear that how the proposed employee’s director would be elected. Company employees might either hold an
oﬃcial election, or they might only be permitted to nominate a candidate
for subsequent appointment by directors or election by shareholders.66 In
the latter case (which is currently practiced in the few British companies
having employee representatives)67 the powers of employees would
remain notional. The purpose of employees’ representatives is not merely
to serve as ﬁgureheads, but to guarantee that employees’ interests are represented in board deliberations. Representatives selected by the board and
voted into oﬃce by shareholders will likely not be suﬃciently independent
from shareholders.
Moreover, the Government has not clariﬁed the prospective role of
employees directors. If the purpose is to represent the interests of employees
and to contribute their concerns to board deliberations, this role could be
potentially in conﬂict with general duties of directors. The UK Companies
Act 2006 clearly indicates that the company is the only beneﬁciary of directors’ ﬁduciary duties.68 Therefore, all the ﬁduciary duties described in sections
171 to 177 of the Companies Act 2006, including the duty to avoid conﬂict of
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interest69 must be discharged in a similar way by employee directors and
others.70
It is far from clear how the proposed employees’ representative will be
positioned to promote and preserve the interests of employees without creating the conﬂict of interest? Also, information sharing between the employees’
director and the group he is representing is a two-edged sword. Employees’
directors may struggle keeping their duty of conﬁdentiality on one hand,
while reducing the asymmetry of information between employees and the
board by providing the employees with reliable information on the other. Information sharing has long been a main concern in the debate about German
codetermination.71 The CEO and the chairman might attempt to withhold
certain information, for example a proposed downsizing, from employees’
representatives because it might leak to the union, politicians, or the business
press. It has thus been argued that the absence of a continued ﬂow of information undermines the functioning of the German supervisory board.72 The
UK Government needs to clarify the mentioned ambiguities on the role of
the employees’ representative. Even if her duty would be to provide
perspective rather than representing particular interests, the scope of her role
should be clear.
The other serious concern is that a single employees’ representative will be
isolated on the board and will not have an impactful voice on the board. For
the Government proposal to work in practice, a critical mass of two or three
directors would have to be appointed. Considering the traditional board structure of UK companies, few ﬁrms will likely choose this option.

4.2. Mandatory report on compliance with section 172
The Government’s fourth option is strengthening the reporting requirements
on how directors comply with the requirements of section 172 to have regard
to the employees’ interests. Again, the details of the proposal could hardly be
less clear. Under the current plan, companies will be required to explain how
they have identiﬁed and sought the views of key stakeholders, why the mechanisms adopted were appropriate, and how they inﬂuenced boardroom
decision-making. In addition to the annual report, the government may
require disclosures on the company website. 73
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The new reporting requirement is expected to encourage directors to give
more thought to how they engage with employees and other stakeholders.74
However, the requirement does not provide any guidance on how directors
can ensure eﬀective engagement.75 Nonetheless, it is not clear that how the
new reporting requirement will be diﬀerent from the contents of section
414C of Strategic Report and Directors’ Report Regulations 2013. Section
414C of Companies Act 2006 requires directors to report to members of the
company how they have performed their duty under section 172.76 The
problem with the current and the proposed report is that directors are required
to report their compliance to the company members only. Unless directors are
required to report to the employees or employees’ representatives directly, the
consideration of employee interest will not be a priority because shareholders
will likely only consider the information relevant to the extent that it serves
shareholder interests. As mentioned above, directors may sacriﬁce the
long-term stability of a company in order to enhance short-term proﬁt
maximization.77 This could be damaging for the long-term development of
the company, and might ultimately harm the economy as a whole.78 One
reason is that in such situations, institutional shareholders would be indiﬀerent to other stakeholder interest or corporate social responsibility.79 As a
result, strengthening directors’ report on compliance with section 172 may
not be an adequate solution to control corporate misconduct in all
circumstances.

4.3. Guidance on the practical boardroom interpretation of directors’
duties under section 172 CA 2006
While the Government has announced that it has no plans to amend the
wording of section 172, it considers publishing a new guidance on the practical boardroom interpretation of directors’ duties, for which it has invited the
GC100 group of largest listed companies to prepare and publish a draft. Considering the ambiguous wording of s 172, such guidance on the performance
of directors’ duties is a step in the right direction. However, without knowing
any details at this point, it is impossible to predict eﬀects.
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4.4. Strengthening the corporate governance framework in the UK’s
largest privately held companies
In addition to the proposed reforms for increasing the employees’ voice, the
Government aims to enhance the conﬁdence of employees and other stakeholders in large private companies by providing a set of corporate governance
principles. Nevertheless, adopting these principles will be voluntary, given
that companies will be permitted to retain industry-level codes and guidance.
At least, in order to increase transparency in private companies, large private
companies with over 2000 employees will be required to disclose their corporate governance arrangements in their Directors’ Report and on their
websites.80
Critics argue that these measures will not impose any meaningful obligations on wrongdoer controlling shareholders and directors to refrain from
detrimental opportunistic behaviour. Even if large private companies in the
UK adopted the corporate governance principles and reporting requirements,
they would not serve to shield companies from harm in all circumstances. For
instance, in cases such as BHS, there would be no shareholders outside the
wrongdoers’ team to discipline directors.

4.5. The government’s governance reforms do not suﬃce to stop
abuse to employees and other stakeholders
The UK Government has claimed that the proposed reforms ‘will improve corporate governance and give workers and investors a stronger voice’.81 The UK
Prime Minister has also pledged to introduce tough new laws for pension
schemes to prevent a repeat of the BHS pension scandal. She has promised
the Pensions Regulator will have the power to block business takeovers
that could be used to raid pension funds.82 As we have seen, the Government
reforms although are promising in rhetoric but will unlikely to have a practical
impact.
All of this reveals the key problem: In proposing these reforms, the Government still assumes that shareholders are the only important group of stakeholders. Only shareholders will receive a report on executive pay, and only
shareholders will have a binding vote on it. Even in terms of strengthening
the employees’ voice, shareholder would still have more rights than the
employees themselves. Directors will still report exclusively to shareholders
on how they discharge their duty to consider employee interests. Also, it is
80
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very plausible that shareholders play a greater role in forming the proposed
advisory council and choosing the employees’ director than the employees.
As previously discussed, shareholders may not always have a long-term orientation, and they may not object to extraordinary rewards for executives as
long as they receive substantial short-term returns on their investments.
They may not care when directors harm the company assets with opportunistic behaviour putting employees’ jobs in jeopardy.
There is no chance that the government’s proposals for large private companies will prevent scandals comparable to BHS, which was a family-run
business in which controlling shareholders and directors stripped the employees’ pension fund. There are many other private companies where there are
no control mechanisms outside of the board of directors. Due to the lack of
scrutiny by markets and regulators, the wrongdoers’ abuses remain
unchecked, and the transparency provided by the proposed corporate governance code would likely not aﬀect internal management.
Employees, however, are the arm and brawn of the company, and the Government has clearly identiﬁed the need for strengthening their protection.
Nevertheless, the Government has failed to adequately address this need to
adopt practical solutions that preserve company stability in the long term.
Therefore, in addition to the current proposals, which are theoretically constructive, directors’ accountability could be strengthened at relatively low
cost by implementing an additional element that would increase the accountability of directors and controlling shareholders towards the company. The
right to initiate a derivative claim, which is currently restricted to shareholders,
should be broadened to employees. The need for broadening the derivative
claim right to other stakeholders, including the employees, has also been
mentioned by respondents to the Government Green Paper.83
We argue that instead of only empowering the pension regulator to
prevent the scandals such BHS in future, it would be better if such enforcement right were granted to employees themselves. Employees have stronger
incentives than the pension regulator to protect their own interests in the
company either in form of protecting their pension schemes or protecting
the company from any other negligent or opportunistic behaviour, which
could harm the company and damaged their interests.

5. Establishing an employees’ derivative claim
How can a derivative claim be a useful mechanism in cases like BHS? As we
previously discussed, protecting the interests of employees very much
depends on the stability of the company in the ﬁrst instance. The derivative
claim is the only direct protection available to the company, as a separate
83
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legal entity, to maintain its sustainability. If a violation of the law harms
employees’ interests, but beneﬁts shareholders in the short run, shareholders
will not necessarily have incentives to bring a derivative claim; or even in cases
like BHS, there might not be a minority shareholder to protect the company.
Consequently, broadening the derivative claim right to employees in such
situations would beneﬁt the ﬁrm.
The BHS tragedy might have been prevented and the company could have
been saved if the company’s employees had been equipped with the right to
initiate a claim on behalf of the company against Sir Philipp Green and all
those other company wrongdoers for their negligence, mismanagement,
and for the misappropriation of the company’s assets through dividends
and a variety of intragroup transactions. Under the current statutory provisions, only shareholders have the right to bring a derivative claim against
a wrongdoer director or another person, or both.84 Nevertheless, in cases
like BHS – which was a private company – there is no shareholder from
outside the wrongdoer’s team to act as a watchdog and control and stop
the wrongdoers’ misconduct. Even if BHS had not been a private family-run
business and there were some outside shareholders with some theoretical
ability to monitor the director’s conduct, the employees’ pension scheme
might not have been any of their concern.
It is thus not clear why only shareholders should have the right to initiate
derivative claims. An employee derivative claim could ﬁll this gap. The derivative
claim’s function does not only serve to compensate the company ﬁnancially; its
deterrence role is also important. The deterrence role would increase the likelihood of a derivative lawsuit by the employees and could have a deterrent eﬀect
in preventing losses to the company and work as a threat to managers or
majority shareholders like Sir Green, who under the current situation feel free
to do whatever they want with the company’s assets while disregarding the
interests of others. Although just like shareholders, employees usually do not
have the right to investigate the company’s documents or get direct information
on the board’s conduct, they are still possibly in a better position to obtain information about the directors’ wrongful conduct in the company than shareholders
from outside. Therefore, if BHS employees had been equipped with the right to
initiate a claim on behalf of the company, they could have challenged directors
or controlling shareholders opportunistic behaviours such as excessive dividends, extraction of cash from the company or depleting the pension funds.

5.1. The proposal is not in conﬂict with other employee rights
It needs to be clear that our proposal is neither a substitute for other proposed
reforms, such as the right to have a representative on the board nor do we
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claim that having the derivative claim right only, would provide ironclad protection for the employees’ interests. However, we argue that the derivative
claim right could work as a complement to other employees’ rights.
The argument is that just like shareholders who have both personal rights
as well as the right to make a claim on behalf of the company, employees who
are often more deeply invested in a company with their human capital, and
are dependent on the company for their livelihoods and their pension
beneﬁts, should have similar right to protect their reﬂective interests. As
Paul Davies argues, employee governance rights which operate only at subboard or only at board level (including the advisory panel and having a representative on board) are unlikely to provide suﬃcient support for a fully
eﬀective cooperation arrangement, but each is arguably a necessary ingredient in a complete structure.85 Employees’ governance rights such as having a
representative on board and a work council can have beneﬁcial eﬀects, provided that the role and function of these mechanisms have been deﬁned
clearly. The employees’ derivative claim right could be the building block to
complete this ediﬁce. It is less likely that mechanisms providing representation for workers work eﬀectively in preventing harm to the company
without an enforcement mechanism to support them. What would be the
advantage of employees being aware of directors’ opportunistic behaviour
that harms the company when they would not have the enforcement
power to stop them?
One might possibly argue that employees could use other platforms such
as media discussions or whistleblowing to bring wrongful conduct to the
attention of the public. However, while either of these mechanisms could
be helpful, they both fall short of holding directors accountable for breaching
their ﬁduciary duties as much as a legal action. Many companies, especially
private companies, are not big or suﬃciently well-known to invoke the
media attention or become the subject of ﬁnancial analysts. The derivative
claim could theoretically play an outsize role in protecting smaller publicly
traded or private companies against the exploitation by majority
shareholders.
Another objection could be that employees should be given stock in the
company, or buy it in order to have a greater governance role. This would
permit them to sue wrongdoer directors in their capacity as the shareholder.
Again, this solution does not apply to all companies. Whether employees hold
shares depends on the ﬁrms’ capital structure, public trading status, and
remuneration policies. As a large privately held ﬁrm, BHS is an example
where employees could not avail themselves of a shareholder derivative
claim.
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5.2. Extending the derivative claim right to the employees’
representative
Based on the arguments given, statutory provisions under the Companies Act
2006 should be broadened to include employees as the claimant for the
derivative claim. In this regard, in addition to the shareholders, the proposed
derivative claim would be initiated by, a registered trade union that represents
employees of the company, or another representative of employees of the
company.
The proposal resembles section 165(2) of the South African Companies Act
2008,86 which clearly permits a registered trade union that represents employees of the company or another representative of employees of the company
to initiate a derivative action. Limiting the derivative claim right to the
employees’ representative would reduce the amount of litigation and undercut concerns about abusive lawsuits.
One objection could be that the employees’ representative, especially a
trade union, might pursue its own agenda rather than serve the employees’
interests. The situation is similar as in collective bargaining, where the
union representative could take advantage of the situation when dealing
with the company’s directors. However, the situation discussed here diﬀers
crucially in that a derivative claim is brought on behalf of the company,
which would receive any possible beneﬁt or remedy. Considering the
factors such as the role of the court, the derivative claim’s tough procedural
requirements and the costs of the litigation, it is unlikely that the derivative
claim would create many opportunities for misuse. It seems doubtful that
employees or their representative take the risk of initiating a time-consuming
and costly litigation, which would not even beneﬁt them personally with the
aim of abusing the directors. If we are too concerned about the risk of employees’ representative abusing the situation of a claim on behalf of the company,
then we could ﬁnd employees’ representative on the board, which has already
been proposed by the UK Government, equally troubling. In the end, this is a
larger question to what extent unions are accountable to their constituents,
and to what extent the relationship between unions and workers entails an
agency problem. If such a concern would aﬀect all union activities, unions
that are properly accountable to workers should be largely immune from to
this criticism.
Another objection might be that the proposed reform would cause an
excessive amount of litigation against company directors and would reduce
directors’ business risk-taking, and consequently aﬀect the proﬁt growth
because broadening liability risks would make directors more risk-averse. In
fact, other jurisdictions have already expanded the derivative claim right to
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other corporate stakeholders, including corporate employees, without such
an eﬀect. For instance, the Canada Business Corporations Act 1985 section
238 provides that in addition to the members, some speciﬁc types of creditors,
and directors, the derivative action can also be initiated by ‘any other person
who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an application’.
Singapore has also taken the same approach to Canada.87 The experience
in these jurisdictions reveals that because of the derivative claim’s procedural
requirements, expanding the derivative claim right to other stakeholders
would not open the ﬂoodgates to litigation against the company.
As mentioned above, our article’s proposal was inspired by section 165(2)
of the South African Companies Act 2008. The section gives standing to
pursue a derivative action to:
a registered shareholder or a person entitled to be registered as a shareholder of
the company or a related company, a director or prescribed oﬃcer of the
company or a related company, a registered trade union representing employees
of the company or another employee representative, or a person who has been
granted standing by the court. (our emphasis)

In fact, the employees’ representative right under the Companies Act 2008 is
not limited to the right to initiate a derivative action. The employees representative could also apply to the court to restrain a company from acting in
conﬂict with the Act88 or to declare a director delinquent or be put on probation. The union as the employees representative could also make an application based on unconscionable abuse of the company as a separate
entity.89 The union must be given access to a company’s annual ﬁnancial
statements to initiate a business rescue.90 Moreover, if there is a directors’ resolution to provide ﬁnancial assistance to a director, the union must be given
written notice of the resolution.91 In addition, a trade union could be a whistleblower and disclose irregularities or contraventions of the Act.92
With regards to the derivative action, in Lewis Group Limited v Woollam and
Others,93 the High Court of South Africa held that:
[o]ne of the most obviously reformative aspects of s165 of the 2008 Companies
Act is that standing to bring derivative actions is aﬀorded more widely than it
appears to have been under the common law. Standing is aﬀorded under s
165 also to directors, employee representatives and any other person who
might obtain the court’s leave to proceed derivatively.’
Singaporean Companies Act section 216A(1)(c), also see Andrew Keay, ‘Assessing and Rethinking the
Statutory Scheme for derivative Actions Under the Companies Act 2006’ (2016) 16 Journal of Corporate
Law Studies 39.
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The court further reasoned that,
[w]hilst the majority of shareholders might be prepared to condone loss occasioned to a company due to the negligent conduct of its directors, employees
faced with resultant redundancy or wage cuts might have a diﬀerent view
and be able to persuade a court that objectively it would be in the company’s
best interests to seek redress against the negligent directors.’94

This article agrees with the court ruling that the employees should have the
right to make a claim on behalf of the company and that their derivative claim
right would pose a greater deterrent to wrongdoers in the company. This is
true especially in private companies whose directors may otherwise feel
suﬃciently secure to interfere as they please with the company’s assets or
to run the company in a way that beneﬁts them personally without having
to consider any consequences of their conduct for others. The derivative
claim right to employees would make directors and managers more cautious
in their conduct. Even if they had shareholders supporting them or ignoring
harm being done to the company, employees would be theoretically in the
position to prevent harmful actions. Hence, the beneﬁt of broadening the
derivative claim provisions to include employees would outweigh its possible
disadvantages.
As was explained above, in light of the South African experience the risk
abusive litigation appears negligible. The derivative claim is a lawsuit on
behalf of the company predicated on shareholders and employees’ ability
to show that the company’s interest is harmed or is in jeopardy. The claim’s
limited grounds, the two-staged judicial procedure for the admission of
derivative suits and the diﬃculty of surmounting the leave requirements
should suﬃce to discourage problematic suits.

5.3. The structure of the current statutory provision should change
The current statutory derivative claim scheme has been established on the
shareholder primacy principle. Under the statutory provisions, only shareholders have the right to initiate the claim. Consequently, the procedure
requirements have been based on the shareholder right only. Therefore, in
case of the broadening of the derivative claim standing to employees, the
wording of the current provisions, as well as some of the procedure requirements, should be amended.
One factor is the current role of the shareholder ratiﬁcation in the context
of the derivative claim. The problem is that the ratiﬁcation is not limited only
to the ratiﬁcation, which has already occurred. Under section 263(3)(c), the Act
also requires the court to use its discretion to consider whether the act or
94
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omission that has raised the derivative claim would be likely to be ratiﬁed or
authorised by shareholders in future. Such considerations would add to the
complexity of the derivative procedure and cause confusion for the courts.
In practice, it would be unpredictable whether the breach of duty would be
ratiﬁed or not unless the court can sustain the procedure until the
company shareholders decide about whether to ratify. This would be particularly unfair to the employees as an applicant because the interest of shareholders and employees is not always in line with each other and their claim
should be considered on the grounds of their own interests only.
Hence, our article’s suggestion is that instead of playing a role as a substantial requirement for assessing a derivative claim under the statutory derivative
claim provisions, ratiﬁcation should be regarded as a factor for the court to
consider with regards to the shareholders’ derivative claim only and in
certain circumstances, but not in cases of employee suits.

6. Conclusion
In light of the BHS scandal and some other companies’ failure in protecting
the employees’ interest, the UK Government has set out some plans to
strengthen the employees’ voice.
The Government’s speciﬁc plans for improving the employees protection
have been set in form of a mandatory report on how directors comply with
the section 172 requirements in considering the employees interest, adopting
either: a designated non-executive director; a formal employees advisory
council; or a director from the workforce on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. Moreover, the Government requires the GC 100 group of the largest listed companies to prepare guidance on the practical interpretation of the directors’ duty
under section 172 of Companies Act 2006. In addition, the Government has
unveiled some other corporate governance reforms such as standardizing
the executive pay and establishing a voluntary set of corporate governance
code for large private companies. The Government proposed reforms, provided that the role and function of these mechanisms will be deﬁned
clearly, may have beneﬁcial eﬀects.
However, our argument is that these proposed reforms would be insuﬃcient to protect the company and its employees. A derivative claim right for
employees would help to further protect their interest in the company. In
the current situation, only shareholders have the right to bring a claim on
behalf of the company when directors fail to comply with their ﬁduciary
duties. Nevertheless, they may not care when directors harm the company
assets with their opportunistic behaviours and put the employees’ jobs in jeopardy as long as they are beneﬁting from short-term developments in the
company. Employees often have better incentives than shareholders to
protect the company in a long run.
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In this regard, the article proposed the broadening of the derivative claim
provisions to a registered trade union that represents employees of the
company, or another representative of employees of the company. Considering a derivative right for employees at least in theory would pose a threat to
wrongdoers, especially in private companies where there is no external
control on directors and controlling shareholders. If directors and other
wrongdoers are aware that their misconduct can be challenged by a larger
group of applicants, they will be more strongly deterred from acting
without care and disloyally, and they would be less likely to run the
company in a way conducive to their personal beneﬁt, while harming the
company itself and its other stakeholders.
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